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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND
MANAGERIAL MOTIVATIONS IN
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES
Duane B. Graddy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the extant literature on the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance relates to the nonfinancial sector. In
general, these studies have attempted to determine if managerial utility functions are univariate; with sales, profits, or growth as the dominant argument,
or whether they arc more complex multi-dimensional constructs. While fruitful results have been obtained from this research design, no one has adapted
it co the bank holding company (BHC) performance question. The present
study attempts to fill this void in the existing literature by examining the relationship between BHC executive compensation and the behavioral objectives
of the organization. Such an analysis is important for two reasons. First,
it may help to explain some of the performance differences between affiliated and independent banks found by past studies (9) . Second, empirical evidence on managerial motivations in BHCs is basic to the construction of more
complete theoretical models of the BHC firm.
II. MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION AND
THEORIES OF THE FI RM
In neoclassical theory, firm~ are motivated by the desire to maximize
profits. Owner-managers are compensated for their "entrepreneurial capacity." The model views individuals as having the option of renting their
resources to another firm or becoming a residual income recipient by managing their own enterprise. The difference between the amount received as a
hired resource and the resid ual income obtained from ownership represents
the reward for entrepreneurial effort [4].
In contrast to the neoclassical approach, Baumol (I] suggests that
executives acting in their own self-interest seek to maximize total revenues
subject to a profit constraint. ' This comtrai nt is imposed on the firm by the
capital market . Shareholders require a return on invested capital at least equal
to their best alternative investment. So the sales maximizing firm must, at
a minimum, achieve this expected return on equity. A further aspect of this
model is that some degree of monopoly power in the product and capital
markets is necessary if sales are to be maximized at the expense of profits.
In the competitive model, the profit constraint limits the firm's output to
the profit maximizing level.
• The financial support of Middle Tennessee State Universily 1s gra1efully a~lnowledgcd.

Another approach to the determination o f executive compensation h
been presented by William on (28]. He hypothesizes that executives attemas 1
to maximize their own utility runctions. Managerial utility is assumed to d~'.
pend on staff expenditures, emoluments, and discretionary profits. These '
factors, in turn, are dependent upon discretionary managerial control.
Managerial discretion is heightened in situatiom where the firm's ownership
is separated from control and where markets are imperfrctly competitive.
Nevertheless, William,on', hypotheses about the interrelationships between ,
executive compensation and the clements or the utility set are complex and
difficult to estimate empirically. For example, executive compensation increase~ with expenditures on staff to the extent that these outlays reflect the
hierarchical organization of the firm. Williamson argues that compensation
at each level of the hierarchy depends on the number of executives at that
level and the number at the level immediately below it. On the other hand,
the substitution of managerial emoluments for nominal salary produces an
inverse relationship betwc:en compensation and staff expenditures or number of employees. There are two reasons for this substitution. First, rewards
realized in the form of perquisites are less visible and hence less likely to pro\ Oke stockholder or labor dissatisfaction. Second. the substitution of perks
for nominal salary reduces personal taxes.
Growth maximization has also been suggested as a basis for managerial
behavior. In Marris's modd [21), for example, the growth rate of productive assets is one of the arguments in the managerial utility function.'
Executive compensation depend, on the growth rate and the valuation ratio
(i.e., the ratio of market value to book value). However, this is not the same
rc~ult ~ugge,tcd by the typical ~hare valuation approach included in basic
finance textbooks. In the Marris model, the firm does not maximize value
per ,hare. Manager~ wb~titute im:rea~es in growth for share value until they
attain an optimum le\el of managerial utility. Presumably, the growth rate
will be pushed beyond the point where the valuation ratio is highest.
Ill. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORIES OF ivtANAGERIAL
COMPENSATION FOR BHC PERFORMANCE

Studies (15, 16, 19, 23, 27) of BHC performance are generally predi·
cated on the assumption that the firm·~ objective function is univariate with
the profit rate or valuation ratio as the single argument. However, in large,
multi-market organization~ where ownership is separated from effective con·
trol and take-overs bid~ are constrained by regulations, managerial preferences may guide operating performance. Few studies address the BHC
performance question in term~ of non-profit maximization motives.
The theories of managerial compensation suggest several types of rational behavior other than the singular objective of maximizing profits.
Nevertheless, whether profit maximization or some managerial preference
hypothesis best explains BHC behavior is an empirical q uestion which can·
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be resolved a priori. This study focuses on the determinants 01 tlHL.
001
executive compensation. In doing so, however, it has a further purpose of
using the results of this analysis to explain some o~ the performance characreristics ofBH Cs found in past studies. Most previous work {15, 16, 19, 23,
27) describes the motivations of BHC executive~ by first isolating performance differences between affiliates and independents and then reasoning backwards. The present study attempts to rever~e the sequence. Such a procedure
may yield a clearer picture of BHC behavior.
IV. SAMPLE AND DATA
The sample for this study is comprised of 80 of the top 150 BHCs for
the years 1976--78. These organizations ranged in average asset size from$ I .3
billion 10 $94 billion. The average firm held assets or $8.5 billion while the
median size was slightl y over $2 billion. In 1978, the cumulative assets of
these organizations represented approximately 60 percent or all commercial
bank resources and 86 percent or the total assets of the BHC sector.
The variables included in the cross-sectional regression models are foted
in Table I. Total executive compensation is measured in two ways. The first
definition includes nominal salary plus bonuses (including bonuses paid in
unrestricted shares of company stock). Encompassed by the second definition are nominal salary, bonuses, director's fees, and deferred compensation (excluding stock options). In both cases the compensation variable
represents an average for the 1977-78 period. The primary data source Y.as
Forbes annual survey of executive compensation. The independent variables
are ratios averaged over the period 1976-1977 and five-year growth rates.
Structural measures representing state branching status and money center
participation were also included in the variable set. Branching status proxies
the hierarchial structure of multi-office organizations and diversification
potential in local and statewide banking markets. The money-center dummy
variable accounts for differences in the complexity of decision-making between regional and money market institution\ and perhaps the extent of international involvement. The five-organization statewide concentration ratio
and its rate of change measure the competitive environment faced by multioffice firms within a given state. Bank acquisitions by BHCs arc generally
limned to the state of domicile. Certain personal traits of the executive may
affect the level of compensation. It is assumed that these can be proxied by
~he number of years the executive has been with the organization. Several
interaction terms were included in an effort to detect interrelationships between managerial motivations and the structural characteristics of the markets; particularly, the level of statewide market power.
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TABLE I
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES

------

Dependent Variables
C,

C,
C,

Total Executive Compensation
Rate of Change in Total Executive Compensation
(Total Executive Compensation/ Total Assets) x 10•

Independent Variables
X,
X,
X,
X,
X,
X.

Total Operating Revenue/ Total Assets
Net Operating Revenue/ Total Assets
Market Value of Equity/ Total Assets
Growth Rate of Total Operating Revenue
Total Assets
I / Total Assets
X- = Gross Wages and Salaries less Executive Compensation/
Total Assets
x, = Total Operating Expenses/ To tal Assets
x, = I; if the BHC is classified as Money-Center. O; otherwise.
x,.
Five Banking Organization Statewide Concentration Ratio
Change in Five Banking Organi zation Statewide Concentration
x ..
Ratio
x,,
Number of Years the CEO Has Been With the Organization
x,, I; if the BHC is Domiciled in a Unit Banking State.
O; otherwise.
I; if the BHC is Domiciled in a Limited-Area Branching State.
x ..
0; otherwise.

V. REGRESSION MODELS
Several different regression models were specified in an effort to isolate
the determinants of executive compensation. The initial specification established a functional relationship between executive remuneration, gross operating revenue (sales proxy) and net profits. However, as noted in previous
studies (2, 12, 20). the direct regression of executive compensation on sales
and profits may violate some of the basic assumptions of the OLS model.
First, operating revenue and net income are not independent. Collinearity
among the regressors reduces the reliability of the estimated coefficients and
makes it difficult to separate the independent influences of the regressors
on the response variable. Second, the error variances may not be constant.
Estimation in the presence of heteroscedasticity produces OLS estimates that
are inefficient and the estimated covariance matrix is biased. Thus, standard
tests of significance lose their reliability.
4

Compliance with the homoscedasticity assumption was determined by
means of the Glejser test [ 18). The absolute values of the residuals from the
initial specification were regressed on various functional forms (ith exponent, reciprocal, and square root) of total assets. Each beta coefficient was
then tested for statistical significance with a two-tailed t-test. These tests confirmed the existence of heteroscedasticity. All of the functional forms were
significant at the .05 level or better, however, the linear version had the highest
1-value. Accordingly, the variables used in the subsequent regression models
were deflated by the book value of total assets.' Deflation by total assets
reduced the degree of multicollinearity among the regressors also.
The transformed equation is listed as (I) in Table 2. These results support the hypothesis that executive compensation is heavily dependent upon
the scale of operation. The coefficients of gross operating revenue and the
reciprocal of total assets were significant at the 5 percent and I percent level
respectively. On the other hand, remuneration was unrelated to the rate of
return on total assets. Thus, in managing the affairs of the holding company, BHC executives appear to be more concerned with the impact of their
decisions on asset turnover than on the profit margin.•••

TABLE 2
REG RESSIO

(I)

c,

"' 3_53tx, + 5.95X, + 79890.20•x.
(1.92)

(2)

(0. 74)

(18.05)

R'

0.8633

Ci

2.76/IX, + 7.0IX, + I83.69tx, + 80382.80· x.
(I .45)

(3)

MODELS

(0.88)

( I. 72)

R'

0.8687

c,

-0.0 IX , + o.21•x, + 50.39•x.
(1.22)

R' = 0.5673

(3.40)

(17.92)

(8.78)

•Denotes significance at the I percent level in one-tail test.
tDen 0 t es s1gm
· 'f'1cance at the 5 percent level in one-tail test.
#Denotes significance at the 10 percent level in one-tail test.
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Formulations such as equation (I) have been criticized by Hogan and
McPheters (14] and Ciscel [2] for neglecting the personal characteristics of
the executives. They suggest including such variables as experience and busi,
ness background. The latter is difficult to quantify. However, to account
for the experience factor, equation (I) was respecified to include the number
of years the executive had been with the organization. Estimation of this equation produced results similar to Hogan and McPheters (14, p. 1065] andCiscel
(2, p. 616). The CEO's length of service had no effect on remuneration.•
Further tests were conducted to ascertain whether certain structural factors might be important in the determination of BHC executive compensation. For example, the complexity of the hierarchial structure of the firm,
as represented by branching status or money-center classification, might be
embodied in the pattern of executive remuneration. Moreover, managerial
motivations may be different in concentrated markets as i.:ompared to unconcentrated ones. Thus, the interaction of sales and profits with market
structure may have a bearing on the level of executive compensation. These
structural factors were accounted for by adding variables X., X, 0 , X,, and
X,. to equation (I). Along with these variables were added a complete set
of interaction terms. While the overall fit of the ~aturated model showed
little improvement over the original equation·, the market structure interaction term yielded interesting results. For example, BHC executive compen~ation was more positively related to sales in more concentrated statewide
markets than in less concentrated ones. This is the kind of oligopolistic behavior that appears as a foundation of the sales maximization model.
The hypothesis that corporate managers arc motivated by the desire to
maximize firm growth subject to some profitability constraint permeates the
writing of Baumol (I] and Marris (21]. In these models, executives are rewarded for achieving a maximum growth rate of sales or productive assets
provided that the rate of profit or valuation ratio does not fall below a level
deemed appropriate by the capital markets. If this is in fact the case, then
the growth rate should appear as an important argument in the compensation function. As a first step in testing this hypothesis, equation (I) was
respecified to include the growth rate of total operating revenue.'
Inspection of equation (2) reveals a statistically significant relationship
between sales growth and the level of BHC executive compensation. In fact,
the growth rate of operating revenues appears to be somewhat more important than asset turnover in determining executive remuneration. Further tests
were conducted to see whether other growth rate concepts might perform
as well as operating revenues. The growth rates of earnings per share, equity
capital, and deposits were entered as regressors in separate specifications of
the compensalion equation. Many different regression models were tried,
but none of them produced significant coefficients for these growth measures.
A more discriminating test might be constructed in terms of the determinants of the growth rate of executive compensation. These tests focus on
those factors which in0uence the rate of change in remuneration over time.
In equation (3), the rate of change in compensation is regressed on the growth
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rate of operating revenue, return on total assets, and the scale factor. The
rowth of BHC compensation is more closely tied to the growth rate of oper!cing revenues than to the return on assets. Substitution of the valuation r~tio
for che profit rate did not change the results. In both cases the regression
coefficient for the profitability measure carried a negative sign but was not
statistically significan1. The negative signs imply that executive compen5ation grows morely slowly (ceteris paribus) in BHCs characterized by relatively high profit margins.' To the extent that high margins constrain the
growth of total output, the results of equation (3) wpporl the Baumol',
revenue growth hypothesis. ' 0
Expense preference behavior is made possible by the \eparation of ownership from effective control and imperfections in the produce and capital markets. As indicated by Williamson (28, p. 1033) if manager~ attempt 10
maximize a utility function whose arguments include salary, security, power,
status, prestige, and pleasure, then their actions to fulfill these aspirations
should manifest themselves as "excessive" expenditures for staff and emoluments. However, as mentioned before, the relationship between these expenditures and nominal remuneration is ambiguous. To the extent that high
staff expenditures represent the complexity of the hierarchical organization
of the firm, one might anticipate a positive relationship between discretionary expenditures and executive compensation. This appears to be Williamson's argumenl. On the other hand, the substitution of managerial
emoluments for nominal salary could produce the opposite result.
The tests for expense preference beha,.ior were ba,ed on the residual
\ariable approach developed by Ciscel and Carroll [3). First, gross salarie\
and wages were regressed on IO!al operating re,.enue. The residuab from this
equation were then used as proxies for the amount of labor costs which were
unassociated with the production of firm sales (output). That is, the residuals were taken as estimates of discretionary staff expenditures. The dcnated
residuals were entered into several versions of the compensation eauation;
however, in no case were the coefficients significantly different fro~ zero.
Estimates \\ere also made using total operating expemes and number of employees. The results were the ~ame.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The results presented in this paper indicate that BHC executi\C.'S are com~nsated for their success in increasing the level and gro" th rate of total operati~g r_evenue and as~et Sile. Moreover, rather than being components of the
ObJect1ve function, the profit rate and valuation ratio appear a, constraints
m the decision process. If BHC executives effectively translate their desire~
into o_rganizational policies, then the operating performance of the affiliated firms should renect the general focu~ on total re, enue as opposed to
alternative
·
Wh.1le the fragmented evidence of past performance
.
o b'Jecuves.
s~udies cannot confirm or deny the sales and growth hypothesis. they do provide st rong support for its existence.
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First, it has been found that BHC affiliates produce more loan output
than their independent counterp~rts_ [_I 5, 19, ~3, 24, 27). ~econd, operating
expenses per dollar of assets are s1gmf1cantly higher for affiliated banks than
for independents I19, 24, 27). While the relative amount of wages and salaries paid to employees does not vary bNween the two groups, the ratio of
"other" operating expenses to total assets is significantly higher for affiliated banks. The expenses included in this category; e.g., advertising costs
and fees upstreamed to the parent for debt service, are ones that might be
associated with a growth objective. Third, studies of BHC performance (16,
I 9, 24, 27) generally find no difference in the operating ratio or profitability
of affiliated as compared to independents. This means that the higher revenues
experienced by BHC affiliates [ 19, 24, 27) are offset by additional expenses
(expansion costs) leaving profitability bet\~een the two groups virtually the
same. Fourth, increased acquisition activity has put downward pressure on
the valuation ratio (22). This result is expected in a growth situation when
a firm expands beyond the value maximizing point. 11
In summary, it appears that BHCs search for affiliates with sacrificablc
profits, or what might be termed unused growth capacity. An independent
bank may be unable to realize this potential due to a lack of diversification
possibilities or, perhaps, limitations in managerial capabilities. In any event,
future modelling of the BHC firm should emphasize the revenue and growth
objectives with the profit rate (or valuation ratio) treated as an important
constraint on the expansion process.

Footnotes
'Profits may affect the level of executive compensation even in this model
however. For example, if the firm is operating at a point below the minimum profit constraint then the executive may be rewarded for increasing
the firm's profitability even though sales are reduced. Such a retrenchment
process sometimes occurs after a successful take-over bid.
'Firm growth has also been emphasized by Bau mo I (I) and Galbraith
(5) as a determinant of executive compensation.
'The residuals from each of the deflated regression equations were also
examined for the presence of heteroscedasticity.
'A recent study by Glassman and Rhoades [6) found no relationship be•
tween the profit rate and ownership for the largest 200 lead banks of BHCs.
Thus, managerial preferences may be evident in the objective functions of
these firms. It might be argued that this test favors acceptance of the sales
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maximization hypothesis by omitting s1ock op1ions from the definition of
executive compensation. However, other studies (20) have shown that, in
general, the results are not very sensitive to 1he definition of managerial
remuneration. Moreover, Hirschey and Werden (12] contend 1hat the use
of ex pose values of s1ock oplions as proxies for ex ante values bias the estimated coefficients of profit and/ or market value because the proxies are by
definition correla1ed with these variables.
'Ciscel and Carroll (3) have presented an interesting respecification of
1he general sales vs. profit equation. To reduce the degree of multicollinearity between profits and sales and to control for possible simultaneous equation bias, they first regressed observed profits on observed sales. The residuals
from this equation were then used as profit proxies in the compensation equation. The residuals were interpreted as profits attributable to reductions in
the cost of production (or increases in technical efficiency). Thus, "the significance of residual profit would provide extremely strong support for the
neoclassical hypothesis; if chief executive officers are rewarded for increasing technical efficiency (sales revenue held constant), there is strong e\ idence
that corporate management is interested in goals other than increasing the
firm's market share or asset size." This idea was incorporated iJ:IIO the present
analysis by replacing X, in equation (I) with residual profits, X,. Estima11on
of this relationship produced a negative sign for X,; however, it was not significantly different from lero at the .10 level. 801h X and X. were ~ignificant with 1he scale factor dominating the relationship.
'The negative sign of variable X,, paralleled the findings of Hogan and
McPheters also.
'The procedure for testing the significance of the interaction term, is
discussed in (18. pp. 418-419 and pp. 455-457) .
.
'The growth rate was measured as operating re\enue (t) minus operating revenue (t-1) divided by total asset~ (t) averaged over a five year period.
'Similar results were ob1ained by Hirschey and Werden ( I 2) for industrial ~orporations. They concluded that "the reward to steadily increasine
sales 1s compounded, but the reward to steady increases in profit or value is
less than that for a one period increase. Thi~ makes the pursuit of sales growtb
~s1z~) much more attractive to the manager than is the steady pursuit of growth
m euher profits or market value."
0

A potential problem with the specification of equation (3) is that it
merely reflects the growth characteristics of different firms and does not allow any generalization about manage rial motivat ions. That is the growth
rate of compensation may be highly correlated with the rates ~f change of
a whole array of financial variables. To examine this possibility the growth
'
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rates of earnings per share, equity capital, and deposits were included as independent variables in separate regression runs. In no case did they reach
a satisfactory level of statistical significance.
'' A problem which detracts from the above arguments is the finding that
affiliated banks have not realized increasing shares in local banking markets. More specifically, if revenue or growth maximization is the overriding
objective of BHCs, why haven't their affiliates captured a larger market share
after acquisition. A few observations might be offered on this point. First,
the relative shares of BHCs in statewide markets have increased dramatically in the last decade (even after allowance for the increase due to the 1970
Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act). Second, most of the studies
of market share changes are based on data from the early stages of the BHC
movement. For example, a recent study by Goldberg (7) found no change
in market shares for banks acquired by multibank holding companies.
However, his data were for the period 1965-1972. Moreover, the average postacquisition interval wa~ only 3.9 years . One might question whether this is
long enough to detect shifts in market shares. Third, most studies proxy market share by total deposits. This may not be an appropriate measure for BHCs
where asset funding options arc bountiful. Perhaps the market share in loans,
total assets, or gross revenues ""ould be a better measure of BHC performance. Along these lines, the pre~ent study indicated that not all growth measures were equally capable of explaining BHC executive compensation.
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